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Abstract 
 
Government regulatory efforts concerning eggs are in the news due to a 
serious salmonella outbreak during the summer of 2010.  Given the 
widespread concern this outbreak raised, there are already anecdotal 
reports of a negative impact on egg demand.  This paper attempts to look 
at one aspect of eggs as a food commodity: the legal regime that regulates 
eggs as an item in the food supply.  First, it will attempt an initial 
historical exploration of egg regulation in the 20th century.  A web of 
different legal authorities sometimes seem to run overlapping circles 
around each other.  The paper will address recent significant changes in 
egg safety regulation, driven mostly by the Food and Drug Administration 
and legislative changes to the overall food safety system.  It will close by 
reviewing the recent salmonella enteritidis scare and possible future 
changes in the egg regulation system. 1 
I. Introduction and Background on Eggs as Food  
Eggs have been a major part of human food consumption for thousands of years 
and across varied cultures around the world.  Their use stretches across the great cultures 
of the East and West, from the eggs of hens in ancient Rome and the European continent 
to various fowl on the Indian subcontinent and in China.
1  In Western cooking, while 
certain reptiles such as the turtle provide sought-after eggs, most consumption is of 
poultry eggs: chickens and other fowl.
2  Today, worldwide consumption of poultry shell 
eggs continues to steadily increase as large developing nations, such as the Brazil-Russia-
India-China (“BRIC”) bloc, raise their standard of living and consume more protein.
3  As 
consumption increases, producers are following, with egg production increasing in the 
past decade as well, particularly amongst larger industrial entities looking to capitalize on 
the “livestock revolution” brought about by economic advancement.
4  Of interest for our 
purposes, however, is that fact that high income per capita countries like the United 
States have seen slower or even declining growth in egg consumption, especially as 
compared to the rapid growth of relatively lower income nations.
5  It seems probable that 
                                                 
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOD AND CULTURE 558 (Solomon H. Katz, ed., 2003).  
2 See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY OF FOOD 499 (Kenneth F. Kiple & Kriemhild 
Conee Ornelas, eds., 2000) (canvassing different types of eggs eaten in Western cultures 
and noting, for example, that “quail eggs, as hard-cooked, shelf-stable, packaged 
products, are now featured on many gourmet food counters in the United States). 
3 Food and Agriculture Organization Poultry in the 21st Century Conference: Avian 
Influenza and Beyond, Martin Upton, Scale and structures of the poultry sector and 
factors inducing change: intercountry differences and expected trends, at 1 (2007), 
available at 
http://www.fao.org/AG/againfo/home/events/bangkok2007/en/background.html (industry 
analysis paper prepared for the United Nations food security organization in conjunction 
with an international conference on poultry and egg consumption). 
4 Id. at 2. 
5 Id. at 3. 2 
other influences, besides merely economic trends, have spurred this de-emphasis away 
from eggs as a food product in wealthier nations.
6   
In the United States, egg consumption has declined quite significantly since the 
halcyon first half of the twentieth century, when Americans consumed, for example, over 
375 eggs per person on an annual basis in 1950.
7  Such consumption is measured not just 
as shell egg consumption but also as consumption of eggs in other prepared food 
products.
8  Throughout this paper, I will attempt to focus its discussion on both modes of 
consumption.  In recent years, American per capita egg consumption has consistently 
been over 100 eggs less than the 1950s peak.
9  While a comprehensive explanation of this 
decline is beyond the scope of this paper, two contributing factors can be suggested.  One 
concerns continuing controversy and attention to the health effects of high egg 
consumption.  Eggs contain a high degree of dietary cholesterol and important scientific 
research has been conducted into possible increased risk of cardiovascular disease from 
their consumption.
10  On the other hand, the evidence is far from conclusive as to such a 
correlation, and other studies in recent decades have questioned advice that urges patients 
                                                 
6 Id. (“The decline in egg consumption in high-income countries suggests that the effect 
of income growth may have reached a peak and demand may be more strongly influenced 
by changes in consumer taste.”). 
7 U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, Food Availability Data 
Set: Spreadsheets: Eggs, (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FoodConsumption/FoodAvailSpreadsheets.htm#eggs. 
8 USDA Economic Research Service, Food Availability Data Set: Documentation: 
Estimating supply and disappearance of major foods, (Mar. 29, 2010), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FoodConsumption/FoodAvailDoc.htm. 
9 See supra, note 7 (showing that consumption steadily fell from the 1950s through the 
1990s but has remained roughly stable just below 250 eggs per person per year since 
then). 
10 See, e.g., Luc Djoussé & John M. Gaziano, Egg Consumption and Risk of Heart 
Failure in the Physicians’ Health Study, 117 CIRCULATION 512 (2008) (concluding that 
infrequent egg use likely only modestly increases mortality but that there was a stronger 
correlation between egg consumption and mortality amongst diabetics). 3 
to refrain from eating eggs.
11  Nonetheless, the controversy seems quite probably to have 
contributed to some of the declining American egg consumption patterns, especially 
given that egg prices have also generally declined on an inflation-adjusted basis over the 
past fifty years.
12  However, while discussion of egg consumption and health impacts are 
a real issue, the federal government’s regulatory role is limited to its incorporation of 
healthy eating advice into the Dietary Guidelines for Americans
13 and using those 
guidelines to regulate certain food consumption, such as public school lunch programs.
14 
Thus, this paper will put the eggs and chronic disease issue to the side and focus 
on a second possible impact on the consumption of eggs: federal and state regulatory 
efforts aimed at the safety and quality of shell egg and other egg products.  Government 
regulatory efforts concerning eggs are in the news due to a serious salmonella outbreak 
during the summer of 2010.
15  Given the widespread concern this outbreak raised, there 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Frank B. Hu, et al., A Prospective Study of Egg Consumption and Risk of 
Cardiovascular Disease in Men and Women, 281 JOURNAL AM. MED. ASSOC. 1387 
(1999) (suggesting that consuming up to one egg per day is unlikely to substantially 
increase the risk of cardiovascular disease amongst healthy individuals). 
12 See Deborah J. Brown and Lee F. Schrader, Cholesterol Information and Shell Egg 
Consumption, 72 AM. J. AGRICULTURAL ECON. 548 (1990) (using statistical analysis to 
argue that heavily publicized cholesterol information concerning eggs restrained demand 
more than would be expected for a product whose price is declining). 
13 See USDA CENTER FOR NUTRITION POLICY AND PROMOTION, DIETARY GUIDELINES 
FOR AMERICANS 12, 2010 (2011) (avoiding direct statements urging reduction of egg 
consumption but recommending limitation of dietary cholesterol to 300 milligrams per 
day); 7 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (2006) (mandating release of updated government dietary 
guidelines every five years). 
14 42 U.S.C. § 1758(f) (2006) (requiring schools that receive school lunch funding to 
manage programs consistent with the Dietary Guidelines). 
15 See, e.g., U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Investigation Update: 
Multistate Outbreak of Human Salmonella Enteritidis Infections Associated with Shell 
Eggs (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/enteritidis/ (final investigation 
details); William Neuman, Egg Recall Expanded after Salmonella Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 19, 2010 at B1. 4 
are already anecdotal reports of a negative impact on egg demand.
16  This paper attempts 
to look at one aspect of eggs as a food commodity: the legal regime that regulates eggs as 
an item in the food supply.  First, it will attempt an initial historical exploration of egg 
regulation in the 20th century.  A web of different legal authorities sometimes seem to 
run overlapping circles around each other.  The paper will address recent significant 
changes in egg safety regulation, driven mostly by the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) and legislative changes to the overall food safety system.  It will close by 
reviewing the recent salmonella enteritidis (“salmonella”) scare and possible future 
changes in the egg regulation system. 
II.  Early Food Regulation: the Pure Food and Drug Act 
The modern age of gradually federalized food safety and quality regulation 
substantially began with the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 (“1906 Act”).
17  This also 
marks the beginning of egg regulation because of the 1906 Act’s expansive “food” 
definition.  While somewhat circular linguistically on closer inspection, “food” consists 
of “all articles used for food…by man or other animals, whether simple, mixed, or 
compound,” clearly embracing eggs.
18  The 1906 Act introduced the “adulteration” and 
“misbranding” concepts into federal law as the fundamental categorization used to 
separate safe food whose quality met those of buyer’s expectations from unsafe and 
                                                 
16 See Molly Peterson, Egg Recall May Be Linked to Salmonella-Bacteria Illiness in 14 
U.S. States, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-
19/egg-recall-expands-as-illness-reported-in-10-states-salmonella-suspected.html 
(interviewing economist who predicted “consumers holding off buying eggs because of 
health concerns will dampen demand and lower prices, more than any supply 
disruption”). 
17 Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). 
18 Id. at 769. 5 
potentially fraudulent food that did not.
19  These concepts remain as basic elements of the 
federal food regulatory system through today and were even integrated into a more 
specific egg and egg product regime established later in the 20th century.  The historical 
record is unclear as to whether eggs were a topic of legislative conversation at the time of 
the 1906 Act’s enactment but attention does seem to have been focused elsewhere on 
products like fresh meat.
20  Interestingly, an early treatise on the new Act does not even 
contain a line in its index for eggs despite entries for such products as Baltimore oysters 
and cranberries and other seemingly less ubiquitous or important food products as 
compared to eggs.
21  The federal government now regulated eggs but they seem to have 
mostly been brought along for the ride. 
III.  Twentieth Century Regulation through 1970: State Regimes 
At the time of the 1906 Act’s passage, any existing government regulation of food 
products would have occurred through state and local regulations.  Such regulatory 
activity had existed in certain places and for selected products since the early colonial 
times and in a more widespread form since the mid nineteenth century.
22  Such regulation 
serves as the default legal regime, in the absence of federal law on the point and deriving 
from the American state’s inherent police power over health and welfare issues.  More 
                                                 
19 See id. at 769, § 7, and 770, § 8. 
20 See, e.g., Ilyse D. Barkan, Industry Invites Regulation: The Passage of the Pure Food 
and Drug Act of 1906, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 18 (1985) (discussing changes in food 
industry and certain publicized scandals but not noting any special concerns about eggs); 
ARTHUR P. GREELEY, THE FOOD AND DRUGS ACT, JUNE 30, 1906: A STUDY WITH TEXT 
OF THE ACT, ANNOTATED, THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE ACT, FOOD INSPECTION, DECISIONS, AND OFFICIAL FOOD STANDARDS 164 (1907). 
21 ARTHUR P. GREELEY, THE FOOD AND DRUGS ACT, JUNE 30, 1906: A STUDY WITH 
TEXT OF THE ACT, ANNOTATED, THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE ACT, FOOD INSPECTION, DECISIONS, AND OFFICIAL FOOD STANDARDS 164 (1907). 
22 See Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation of 
Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 2 (1984). 6 
archival research is necessary to more fully understand the exact state regulatory picture 
specifically regarding eggs at the turn of the century and during the early years of general 
federal adulteration and misbranding regulation.  But at least one recent government 
document suggests that the first three states, South Dakota, Illinois, and Iowa, began 
regulating eggs as a specific product in 1919.
23 
We also know the nature of state regulation by the 1960s so we can supplement 
secondary evidence by inferring its development into more specialized regimes over the 
course of the 20th century.  A 1970 House report references a U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) survey of state egg regulation regimes, conducted in the late 
1960s.
24  By 1968, all states (assuming that all states had returned the USDA survey) had 
a shell egg regulatory regime in place.   
“Shell egg” is a term of art in egg regulation, often defined by what it is not.  It is 
not the other major consumed egg substance subject to regulation, an “egg product.”  
Federal law defines “egg products” as “dried, frozen, or liquid eggs.”
25  We should make 
a brief digression on the nature of “egg products.”  For most consumers, egg products 
bring to mind such products as egg substitutes or eggnog or the like.  Many of these 
consumer products, however, are exempted from direct, specific egg regulation through 
exemption authority given to the USDA in federal law.
26  Examples include imitation 
                                                 
23 USDA, AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE, AH-75, EGG-GRADING MANUAL 51 
(2000) [hereinafter USDA EGG-GRADING MANUAL]. 
24 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1670, at 8 (1970) [hereinafter EGG PRODUCTS ACT REPORT]. 
25 See 21 U.S.C. § 1033(f). 
26 See id. (creating exception authority for products “which contain eggs only in a small 
proportion” and for products which generally have not been “in the judgment of the 
Secretary, considered by consumers as products of the egg food industry.”) 7 
eggs, eggnog mix, and sandwiches containing eggs.
27  The reasoning behind such 
exemptions seems to be that such consumer products will already have had their egg 
product component ingredients inspected.  Thus, egg product in egg regulatory parlance 
refers only infrequently to consumer products and more regularly to bulk products used 
in institutional and commercial settings such restaurants, hospitals, bakeries, and food 
manufacturers.
28  Shell eggs are never explicitly defined, at least in federal statutes and 
regulations, most likely because their meaning is assumed to be self-evident.  Indeed, one 
has difficulty describing a shell egg without either using the word “egg” in the definition 
or resorting to elaborate descriptive attempts around using the word “egg.”  For the 
purposes of federal and state regulation, no case or legislative debate ever seems to have 
questioned the self-evident meaning of “shell egg,” those whole eggs laid by poultry and 
sold in commerce in their whole form.  The quality and condition of shell eggs, on the 
other hand, has been a source of dispute, to be discussed later. 
Returning to a discussion of state regulation in the first half of the twentieth 
century, we know that states regulated shell eggs as a specific food product.  However, 
the nature of this regulation differed from state to state.  In some states, regulation was 
limited to grade and labeling requirements for retail egg sales.  Grading is a procedure 
where a general standard is applied to the quality of specific eggs being inspected.
29  On 
                                                 
27 See 9 C.F.R. 590.5 (2010). 
28 USDA, Food Safety and Inspection Service, Fact Sheet: Shell Eggs from Farm to 
Table (April 20, 2011), 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/factsheets/focus_on_shell_eggs/index.asp#11 [hereinafter Shell 
Eggs from Farm to Table]. 
29 See USDA, AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE, AMS 56, UNITED STATES 
STANDARDS, GRADES, AND WEIGHT CLASSES FOR SHELL EGGS 2 (2000) (“Consumers can 
purchase officially graded product with the confidence of receiving quality in accordance 
with the official identification.”). 8 
its face, it does no more than provide a standardized reference point to consumers in 
order to make more informed buying decisions.  For this reason, labeling requirements 
often complement grading laws; grading not shared with the public and used only for 
regulatory purposes tends to be seen as both less useful in ensuring the integrity of the 
product market and also possibly more likely to invite abuse.  When a grade is labeled on 
a particular product, the knowledgeable consumer, familiar with the general standard a 
grade represents, can match it against the actual egg they are holding in their hands. 
This information-enhancing regulation was carried out in all states by the time of 
the 1968 survey.
30  But a significant number of states limited their regulation to grading 
and labeling.
31  Those that went beyond this basic regulation varied in the extent of 
additional regulation.  A large majority of states regulated and restricted the sale of eggs 
categorized by the industry as “rejected” for various reasons, such as functional value, 
whether the egg is edible, or whether it is cracked or leaking.
32  Such problems can 
indicate safety issues, as will be apparent when exploring the recent salmonella concerns 
later in the paper.  A smaller number of states, about half, went further and restricted the 
sale of dirty eggs or of un-candled eggs.
33  An even smaller number of states restricted 
the sale of another less-than-perfect type of egg, “checked” eggs.  Checked eggs are eggs 
with cracks that do not permeate the membrane lining and thus their contents are intact.
34  
Their permissibility during certain eras could be at least one of the factors leading to that 
                                                 
30 See EGG PRODUCTS ACT REPORT, supra, note 24 at 8. 
31 Id. at 8-9. 
32 Id. at 8. 
33 Candling is a process, largely automated today, where light is used to illuminate both 
“interior defects” and difficult-to-spot shell cracks.  See Shell Eggs from Farm to Table, 
supra, note 28. 
34 EGG PRODUCTS ACT REPORT, supra, note 24, at 8; see 9 C.F.R. 590.5 (2010). 9 
familiar supermarket occurrence, the dutiful shopper scrupulously checking their eggs for 
cracks (other obvious factors include retail store handling of the egg and transport 
conditions). 
At the time of the congressional report, most states regulated egg products, as 
generally defined above, only through their general food safety and quality regulations 
than those states that had specific regulations focused on egg products.  In a handful of 
states, even general food regulation did not reach egg products.
35  In many states, 
regulation of shell eggs or egg products, if any, often did not reach as far as trade in these 
eggs or products between manufacturers or producers and wholesale or institutional 
buyers, such as bakeries or restaurants. 
  The system of state regulation prior to federal consolidation of control later in the 
twentieth century suggests one point deserving of further research.  The division of food 
safety regulation between the FDA and USDA, particularly for perishable items such as 
eggs and meat, has been roundly criticized as inefficient and possibly complicit in 
allowing lax regulation on certain safety animal welfare issues.
36  But we know that the 
division of responsibilities is at least reflected in a division of regulatory regimes as far 
back as the state regulation earlier in the twentieth century.  Perhaps these regimes were 
enforced by the same state agency but perhaps not.  Thus, the only conclusion to be 
drawn here, at least, would be to urge caution before claiming that institutional 
arrangements are mostly about turf protection and too-cozy industry relations.  Historical 
                                                 
35 EGG PRODUCTS ACT REPORT, at 9. 
36 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-487T, HUMANE METHODS OF 
SLAUGHTER ACT: WEAKNESSES IN USDA ENFORCEMENT (2010); Sandra B. Eskin, 
Putting All Your Eggs in One Basket: Egg Safety and The Case for a Single Food-Safety 
Agency, 59 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 441 (2004). 10 
practice also often plays a part and may play a part in the structure of egg regulation, 
given its origins in state-level regimes. 
IV.  Egg Regulation Through 1970: USDA Grading and Standards of Quality   
The Egg Products Act Report discusses another aspect of state egg regulation that 
allows us to begin transitioning toward the federal role in egg regulation.  It notes that a 
number of important egg consumption states have grade and quality standards that differ 
from a consistent set of standards that most states follow.
37  The consistent set of 
standards many states followed was not a mere coincidental convergence.  First, a decade 
after the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act, Congress passed the Farm Products 
Inspection Act of 1917, an initial authorization to begin grading eggs and allowing 
producers to voluntarily participate in grading inspection of the product.
38  A 1946 
federal statute replaced the 1917 law with the Agricultural Marketing Act and gave 
authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out certain agricultural market-
enhancement activities, including quality standards.
39  Specifically, this was 
accomplished through a broad delegation to the Secretary of authority to “develop and 
improve standards of quality, condition, quantity, grade, and packaging, and recommend 
and demonstrate such standards in order to encourage uniformity and consistency in 
commercial practices.”
40  The standards remained voluntary both as to whether states 
would follow them and also as to whether producers would participate in the USDA’s 
grade and quality inspection program.  A series of different bureaus, offices, services, and 
administrations have been responsible for egg grading and inspection since 1917 and the 
                                                 
37 EGG PRODUCTS ACT REPORT, supra, note 24, at 9. 
38 7 U.S.C. § 492 (repealed 1955); USDA EGG-GRADING MANUAL, supra note 23, at 51. 
39 7 U.S.C. 1621 et seq. (2006). 
40 7 U.S.C. 1622(c) (2006). 11 
serpentine transfer of authority amongst them would be a worthy archival project in its 
own right.  Generally, though, the modern administration of the egg grade inspection 
program resided, and continues to reside, in the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service, 
continuously in charge of the program since 1972.
41  The AMS also is responsible for 
producing and disseminating market information, something it does each week through 
the egg market news reports.
42   
  At least one court has heard a challenge arguing that the AMS grading and 
inspection scheme should be considered to preempt state and local regulation.  But the 
nature of the argument sheds light both on why the argument was not successful and also 
on the structure of the federal-state egg regulation regime.  In L&L Started Pullets, Inc. v. 
Gourdine,
43 a group of egg producers argued that federal regulation and intervention into 
the market through rulemakings and inspections affecting producers should preempt New 
York State and New York City regulation of consumer egg products on retail store 
shelves.  The court distinguished the two regulatory interventions as not overlapping, 
especially given that federal grading inspections remain voluntary.  It thus rejected the 
preemption claim: 
The inspection and labeling of consumer bought eggs falls within the 
historic police powers of the state. Therefore, to prevail plaintiffs must 
show either a clear and manifest congressional intent to invalidate all state 
and city laws within this field of regulation, or that the federal scheme of 
                                                 
41 See National Archives and Records Administration, Records of the Agricultural 
Marketing Service, (last accessed Apr. 25, 2011), 
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/136.html. 
42 See 58 USDA AMS EGG MARKET NEWS REP. 35. 
43 592 F. Supp. 367 (D.C.N.Y. 1984). 12 
regulation actually conflicts with the state and city scheme. Plaintiffs have 
failed to establish either of these bases for preemption.
44 
Such thinking informs the structure of the egg regulation system to this day, with the 
federal government restricting its regulatory efforts in large part to stages of the “farm-to-
table” process prior to retail sale and the state and local agriculture or health agencies 
focusing on retail, institutional, and restaurant regulation and monitoring with limited 
interventions into the production process occurring in some select states.
45 
V.  Eggs and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act   
The next step in our march through the history and current structure of U.S. egg 
regulation moves us away from interaction between state and federal regulators and back 
to the FDA’s broad food and drug safety statutory authority, first granted in the Pure 
Food and Drug Act.  This authority was substantially reaffirmed and strengthened in the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”) of 1938.
46  Early court cases affirmed 
FDA’s broad authority to seize “adulterated” goods.
47  These early cases established 
principles that continue to define the FDA’s authority under the FDCA (even though the 
cases themselves interpreted the Pure Food and Drug Act).  These include that the 
“adulteration” provision contains no intent requirement so adulterated food, even if it is 
no longer intended for human or animal consumption, remains adulterated under the 
FDCA.  Even more important for our purposes, Hipolite Egg saw the Court expansively 
                                                 
44 Id. at 372. 
45 For additional cases upholding the state’s ability to regulate consumer egg sales under 
its police powers, see Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 956 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1992); 
Ex parte Foley, 158 P. 1034 (Cal. 1916). 
46 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). 
47 See United States v. Thirteen Crates of Frozen Eggs, 208 F. 950 (D.C.N.Y. 1913); 
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911). 13 
interpret the nature of interstate commerce, a necessary condition for meaningful FDA 
authority over the eggs.  There, the Court ruled that adulterated eggs containing an 
external chemical and delivered to a bakery for use there in production could still be 
seized by the FDA even though they were no longer actually moving in interstate 
commerce and would not be sold whole to consumers.
48  Of course, this decision 
occurred during the Court’s Lochner Era and it is certain that a modern Court, with a 
much more expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence, would uphold a robust FDCA.  
Regardless, this issue seems settled in the case of eggs, as research has not turned up any 
modern cases challenging FDA egg regulation on arguments as to the scope of the 
FDCA. 
  What has the FDA done with its general authority under the FDCA to regulate 
food, including eggs?  Until recently, it chose not to engage in specific rule-making and a 
regime of specific, detailed regulatory proscriptions and prescriptions.  Instead, it seems 
to have pursued a strategy with two pillars: first, enforcement through spot inspections on 
a periodic basis or as a result of attention (from consumers or other sources) paid to 
particular instances of adulteration.  A former USDA official analogized this enforcement 
method to highway speed patrols: “It’s only illegal when you get caught.”
49  A second 
principle of FDA regulation was to avoid using its broad authority in such a way as to 
intrude on the regulatory spheres of other federal agencies, primarily components of the 
USDA, involved in egg regulation and of the state and local authorities.  This reticence 
                                                 
48 See Hipolite Egg, supra, note 47, at 58. 
49 Timothy W. Martin & Alicia Mundy, FDA’s New Rules Signal Closer Look at Egg 
Farms, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 24, 2010, at A4. (“If a company was taking 
shortcuts, it would only become apparent if there was illness involved or if there was an 
audit performed by the FDA.”). 14 
moderated somewhat in the past fifteen years or so as FDA has take the role of lead and 
coordinating agency in responding to salmonella disease control. 
  Thus, we can summarize egg regulation through 1970.  At the state-level, many 
health departments regulated retail sales of consumer egg products and shell eggs, 
including spot checks for both quality and safety issues, through either general health 
regulation or through specific language relating to eggs.  Many states, generally through 
their agriculture departments, administered mandatory or voluntary grading and quality 
inspection programs at the production stage.  In many states, these inspection regimes 
were pegged to the USDA’s national grade and quality standards (and many egg 
producers relied on the USDA’s continuous inspection service although the service, if not 
the standards depending on the location, remained a voluntary one).  In certain key states, 
however, the state-level grading and quality standards differed in material ways from the 
USDA national standards.  All the while, the FDA maintained general regulatory 
authority under first the Pure Food and Drug Act and then the FDCA to inspect 
producers, transporters, and retailers upon suspicion of adulteration or mislabeling of all 
egg-derived products, both those labeled as “egg products” and as “shell eggs.”  The 
FDA exercised this authority from time-to-time in the case of producers and transporters 






                                                 
50 For an overview of egg regulation prior to 1970, see generally EGG PRODUCTS 
INSPECTION ACT REPORT, supra, note 24. 15 
VI.  The Egg Products Inspection Act of 1970   
1970 marks a line in the sand because it is during this legislative session that 
Congress passed the Egg Products Inspection Act (“EPIA”).
51  EPIA marks the most 
extensive federal legislative attention ever paid to eggs as a specific regulatory target.  
EPIA also forms a triumvirate with the FDA Egg Safety Rule
52 and USDA regulations 
setting up voluntary grading and inspection under the authority of the Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1946.  These three regulatory actions, one statutory and the other two 
administrative rulemakings, are the three most detailed federal efforts dealing with eggs. 
  A common perception (misperception?) concerning the nature of federal egg 
regulation suggests that the FDA controls shell egg regulation and the USDA controls 
egg products regulation.
53  While to a great extent functionally true, this statement also 
stems from ambiguities present in EPIA and from historical practice since its enactment.  
After exploring the Act, a reconceptualization of the legal architecture for federal egg 
regulation will be proposed. 
  EPIA acknowledges the danger of salmonella and has support in a preventive 
theory of continuous inspection rather than relying solely on adulteration or misbranding 
seizures under general FDCA authority.
54  In USDA testimony concerning the bill, 
administration officials spoke in strong support of enhanced protections for both eggs and 
                                                 
51 Pub. L. No. 91-597, 84 Stat. 1620 (1970). 
52 Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, Storage, and 
Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33030 (July 9, 2009) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16 and 118). 
53 See, e.g., PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL, AND LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, 
FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 35-36 (3d ed. 2008); DONNA U. VOGT, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20338, FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR EGG SAFETY: 
A FACT SHEET (1999). 
54 See EGG PRODUCT INSPECTION ACT REPORT, supra, note 24 (“Lack of legislation for 
effective regulation of handling and disposition of poor quality eggs and for inspection of 
egg products to prevent adulteration or misbranding is injurious to the public welfare.”). 16 
egg products.
55  Yet the federal government has never mandated continuous inspection of 
shell eggs.  Bifurcation of both inspection methods and of regulatory responsibilities 
began in earnest with the EPIA.  Deeper archival research is needed to attempt a 
reconstruction of what led to this bifurcation, especially given that EPIA and subsequent 
historical practice have always left enough ambiguity to suggest the possibility of a 
uniform regulatory approach. 
  EPIA’s approach becomes clear as soon as one moves past committee testimony 
and the broad brush strokes of the congressional statement of findings.
56  In the 
congressional declaration of policy
57, each of the major principles in EPIA is stated: 1) 
Inspection of certain egg products; 2) Mandatory standards concerning keeping certain 
undesirable types of shell eggs out of the food supply; 3) Uniformity of quality standards 
for shell eggs; and 4) Relatively broad grants of regulatory authority to prevent 
“adulteration” or “misbranding” of both eggs and egg products. 
  A few key points emerge from the definitions section of the statute.
58  
“Adulteration” and “misbranding” are defined almost identically with their respective 
definitions in FDCA.
59  These similar definitions suggest another point of departure for 
future investigation: since USDA has substantially implemented the EPIA, have FDA and 
                                                 
55 Id. at 1 (“Thus, we must make every effort to assure that eggs and egg products, that is, 
liquid, frozen, or dried eggs, are safe and wholesome for consumers.”) (emphasis added) 
(testimony of Richard E. Lyng, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture). 
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57 21 U.S.C. § 1032 (2006). 
58 21 U.S.C. § 1033 (2006). 
59 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 1033(a)(“Adulterated”) and (l)(“Misbranded”) (2006) with 21 
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USDA given differing interpretations to the meanings of “adulteration” and 
“misbranding” and, if so, are those differences justified by structural, textual, or other 
differences between the FDCA and the EPIA?  Since enactment of the EPIA, one portion 
of the “adulteration” definition was triggered when the FDA approved irradiation as a 
technique for eliminating salmonella from shell eggs.
60  Only FDA approval would 
exempt irradiation from the “adulteration” definition’s ban on any intentional radiation.
61 
  The “adulteration” definition is detailed and covers both eggs and egg products.  
But the EPIA also gives mutually exclusive definitions for eggs versus egg products.
62  In 
this way, subsequent provisions of the statute will divide the inspection regime by 
carefully applying certain provisions only to egg products.  EPIA also codifies into law a 
series of definitions for rejected eggs, previously present only as part of the AMS 
voluntary grading and quality standards.
63  Cracked eggs, whether or not piercing the 
membrane, those that are dirty, and those suffering from organic rot, amongst other 
problems, were all by law classified as rejected.  Salmonella presence would not 
necessarily be included under any of these “rejection” categories but could be prevented 
through one of the categories qualifying an egg as “adulterated.”
64  A final key boundary 
line-drawing definition is that of “plant.”  Even in parts of the EPIA that add regulatory 
restrictions to both eggs and egg products, many of these provisions are subsequently 
                                                 
60 See Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 65 Fed. Reg. 
45280 (July 21, 2000). 
61 21 U.S.C. § 1033(a)(7) (2006). 
62 For discussion of the difference between the two definitions, see, infra, text associated 
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63 See 21 U.S.C. § 1033(g)(1) to (8) (2006). 
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limited by having them apply only to production in “plants,” defined as a “place of 
business where egg products are processed” rather than any place of business where eggs 
are processed or produced.
65 
  EPIA’s heart is its mandate of continuous inspection for safety and quality of all 
egg product processing facilities in the country.
66  By 1970, the USDA reported that 
roughly eighty percent of the gross egg product production in the U.S. was already under 
continuous inspection through voluntary USDA inspection.
67  The USDA also reported 
that twenty three million pounds of egg product, or four percent of the total egg product 
produced in a year, was segregated as “not fit for human food” by identification as such 
in the course of USDA continuous inspection.
68  Given this relatively substantial amount 
of rejected product, the clear inference was that those production facilities not 
participating in the voluntary inspection program were likely putting rejected product into 
the retail food market.
69  In that case, periodic spot inspections combined with retail 
regulation by state authorities might not be able to fully ensure the integrity of the egg 
market.  Interestingly, analogous arguments have been made urging continuous or very 
frequent inspections, as opposed to occasional spot checks combined with outbreak 
response actions, for salmonella and other microbes.
70 
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69 See id. (“Manufacturers can use undesirable eggs and produce products that are 
difficult to distinguish from edible, wholesome products.  This is done through the use of 
deodorants, filtering devices, flavoring ingredients, or pasteurization.”). 
70 See, e.g., Elizabeth Dahl & Caroline Smith DeWaal, Center for Science in the Public 
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  Much of the Act continues to focus on egg product production plants, directing 
the USDA to set up an inspection regime for those facilities.  Thus, it comes as a bit of a 
surprise when one reaches the prohibitions provision and finds language applying to all 
eggs and egg products.
71  The prohibitions section is again similar to broader provisions 
in the FDCA that supplement definitions and disfavored food characteristics by banning 
the parallel disfavored behavior leading to those characteristics (if Food Product A must 
not have X harmful characteristic, the prohibition bans Activity Leading to X).  In the 
EPIA, it prohibits the buying, selling, or transport of “any restricted eggs” as well as the 
possession by an egg handler of “restricted eggs” for a purpose related to human food 
consumption.
72  On its face, this provision seems to cover all eggs in the U.S. market 
rather than just those destined for egg product facilities.  On the other hand, since 
“restricted eggs” only possibly encompass eggs plagued by salmonella or other microbes, 
the expansive prohibition may still fall short of an even broader FDCA authority.  Efforts 
to protect consumers from salmonella have found legal authority elsewhere, and not in 
this portion of the EPIA.  But an alternative history could have been written, given that 
section 1037 prohibits trade or possession of restricted eggs and given that restricted eggs 
include “loss” eggs that are “unfit for human food” due to “contamination.”
73 
  The section 1037 prohibition provisions in the EPIA are the strongest argument 
for refuting received wisdom that FDA has predominant legal authority over shell eggs.  
Additional support comes from EPIA implementing regulations promulgated by the 
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USDA Secretary and administered by the Agricultural Marketing Service (“AMS”).
74  In 
particular, USDA uses EPIA authority to promulgate periodic (quarterly) inspection 
authority of all businesses dealing with eggs for human consumption.
75  Consistent with 
the approach of all agencies involved in egg regulation, EPIA and AMS’ rules exempt 
certain categories from inspection and enforcement of the “restricted” eggs prohibition.  
Notable exemptions include: groups of eggs that have less than an accepted quantitative 
regulatory tolerance of “restricted” eggs; direct-to-consumer sales of eggs by poultry 
producers; very small producers (less than 3,000 hens); and wholesale businesses like 
bakeries and restaurants as long as they are using egg products that were inspected by the 
USDA.
76  Both the EPIA and its regulations also apply the same inspection requirement 
and “restricted” egg criteria to imported eggs and egg products.
77 
  Today AMS’ Poultry Programs, Grading Branch operates the Shell Egg 
Surveillance Program, the actual program carrying out the EPIA regulations concerning 
shell eggs.
78  The above legal analysis clearly demonstrates that not only is there an 
existing specific regulatory program within USDA dealing with shell eggs but also that 
this program probably does not approach the full extend of possible authority to regulate 
shell eggs under the EPIA, including for salmonella.  Perhaps it is a testament to its 
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lackluster budgetary, institutional, or political support but AMS is rarely even referred to 
in conversations about the federal regulatory universe for eggs.  Instead materials 
dutifully note that FDA shares responsibility for egg safety with the Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (“FSIS”).  A typical statement in reference materials within the 
agriculture industry runs: “The two agencies [FDA and FSIS]…both share authority in 
regard to egg safety because FSIS is in charge of inspecting plants processing liquid, 
frozen, and dried egg products, while FDA monitors fresh eggs.”
79  These statements 
seem to completely leave out the authority delegated to AMS for shell egg inspections.  It 
is thus no wonder that, since the enactment of the EPIA in 1970, little specific preventive 
shell egg regulation has occurred and when it has, it has been through the FDA’s general 
authorities. 
VII.  Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service   
Yet another USDA agency typically ignored in sketches of federal egg regulation 
is the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”).
80  Congress passed the 
Animal Health Protection Act in 2002 to consolidate, clarify, and legally reiterate 
authority to monitor infectious diseases amongst livestock and quarantine animals if 
necessary.
81  Under that and other statutes dealing with livestock infectious diseases, the 
                                                 
79 Cornell University Cooperative Extension, Who Are the Responsible Parties of the 
Tiered System? (last accessed Apr. 25, 2011), available at 
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(2008). 22 
USDA Secretary delegated rulemaking and enforcement authority to APHIS, another 
modern USDA agency that is the product of much too many reorganizations to mention 
here.
82  APHIS in turn created the National Poultry Improvement Program (“NPIP”) for 
breeding and commercial poultry.
83  The NPIP is technically voluntary but APHIS has 
applied it as mandatory for any poultry moving in interstate commerce.
84  APHIS 
authority under the Animal Health Protection Act is broadly given, not unlike the 
relatively broad grants in parts of the FDCA and EPIA. 
VIII.  Modern Egg Regulation and Salmonella   
At this point, we have now sketched the outlines of three distinct lines of statutory 
and regulatory authority to administer an egg safety regime in the U.S. (putting aside for 
now the concurrent state authority to regulate).  Two of these lines run through the 
USDA, one derived from the general mandate to prevent livestock disease in the Animal 
Health Control Act and the second derived from a specific mandate in the EPIA to 
protect eggs and egg products from “adulteration” and “misbranding.”  The third line of 
authority runs through the FDA and derives from its general authority under the FDCA 
to, like the EPIA, protect the public from “adulteration” and “misbranding” of food 
products.  Of the three lines of authority, none stands out as inherently more powerful or 
effective if one has as a goal more stringent regulation of egg safety.  APHIS’ authority is 
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focused on contagious pests and disease so it would be inappropriate for regulation of 
general egg hygiene and quality concerns.  This is a significant limitation.  But if the 
regulatory challenge of the future is salmonella and other microbial diseases each statute 
seems to offer sufficient legal authority for confronting this problem through prospective 
regulation. 
  In fact, recent FDA actions have attempted just such a prospective solution.  As 
early as the 1980s, the FDA and various USDA agencies were aware that salmonella 
seemed on the rise and posed a greater danger to egg consumers.
85  Most alarming was 
the discovery that salmonella was no longer confined to cracked or spoiled eggs but could 
infect consumers through intact shell eggs.  FDA and FSIS generally took the lead in 
planned regulatory responses even though research demonstrated that salmonella could 
be passed to an intact egg during the incubation period
86, a fact suggesting that APHIS’ 
authority over livestock disease prevention might be the natural locus of prevention 
efforts.  
  In its responses to salmonella during the 1990s, FDA chose to rely on yet another 
statutory authority, so far not yet discussed.  In 1999, FSIS engaged in a rulemaking that 
updated a provision in the EPIA concerning refrigeration of egg products.
87  The EPIA 
provision offered little discretion in implementing this rule: the Secretary was directed to 
conduct inspections of shell egg production facilities to ensure that already packed eggs 
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are maintained in refrigeration of forty five degrees Fahrenheit or less.
88  At the time of 
this FSIS rulemaking, FDA chose to join FSIS in a food safety initiative.  In doing so, it 
relied not solely on the FDCA but also on another federal statute, the Public Health 
Service Act (“PHSA”).
89  The PHSA grants broad power to the FDA
90 in order to: 
[P]revent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable 
diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one 
State or possession into any other State or possession. For purposes of 
carrying out and enforcing such regulations, the Surgeon General may 
provide for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest 
extermination, destruction of animals or articles found to be so infected or 
contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and 
other measures, as in his judgment may be necessary.
91 
A close parsing of the above language shows that this provision is a powerful grant of 
power to regulate food and livestock involved in the production of food whenever 
communicable diseases are implicated.  Salmonella is clearly a communicable disease; it 
is a microorganism passed from the poultry bird via the egg as disease vector to the 
human stomach, where it causes gastroenteritis.
92  While the PHSA could not regulate all 
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aspects of egg inspection and quality control, it could powerfully shape any parts of the 
production process relating to salmonella transmission. 
  Initially, in 1999, FDA used its PHSA authority to engage in two modest rule-
makings.  First, it complemented the existing FSIS rule concerning egg refrigeration by 
issuing its own rule requiring refrigeration of all shell eggs in retail establishments at 
temperatures of forty five degrees Fahrenheit or less.
93  In this same rule-making, though, 
it also used its PHSA communicable disease prevention authority to require safe handling 
warning labels on all shell eggs in interstate or intrastate commerce.
94  The theory of 
legal authority in this case makes it analogous, although not perfectly, with the Surgeon 
General’s tobacco warning labels issued under the PHSA.  While eggs are not the only 
possible vector for pathogens, they remain the only food that FDA has required bear such 
labels.
95 
  FDA returned to its authority under the PHSA, as well as the FDCA, in a much 
more substantial way with the long-planned Egg Safety Rule of 2009 (“FDA Egg 
Rule”).
96  This rule represented a major expansion of FDA preventive oversight in egg 
safety as well as the most significant expansion of federal egg safety requirements since 
the enactment of EPIA in 1970.  The final promulgation of the rule came five years after 
the proposed rule 
97but given its relatively large impact, including in the balance between 
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the various regulatory agencies, this gap in time is not surprising.  In the background 
information prior to the text of the FDA Egg Rule, FDA makes clear that it supports 
consensus scientific evidence showing salmonella is primarily transmitted to eggs 
“transoverian” rather than through environmental contaminants.
98  This scientific basis 
for the spread of salmonella through shell eggs suggests future preventive regulation may 
continue to focus on the poultry animals rather than merely on storage and handling 
conditions for the eggs.  FDA’s rationale for intervening most directly at the production 
stage entails two points: first, as just noted scientific consensus suggests transmission 
often occurs while the egg is incubating; and second, efforts to reduce illness severity and 
spread among consumer populations have slowed in effectiveness, suggesting any gains 
that can be made at the production stage should be taken.
99 
  The FDA Egg Rule is a very, detailed programmatic intervention.  However, a 
discussion of at least its highlights is appropriate here.  First, the rule only applies to 
producers with greater than 3,000 egg-laying hens.
100  Second, producers, and transporter 
or handlers for certain provisions are required to undertake certain preventive 
requirements subject to enforcement inspections by the agency: a written salmonella 
prevention plan; producers must obtain chicks that have been monitored for salmonella 
(often requiring participation in the APHIS inspection service described above); operate a 
“biosecurity” program of limited access by humans and animals to production facilities; 
pest control; and disinfecting procedures when a salmonella-infected egg is found.
101  
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Producers are also now required, for the first time, to register with FDA, a procedure in 
place at AMS and FSIS but not at FDA.
102 
  For most producers (except for very large ones with greater than 50,000 hens), the 
FDA Egg Rule goes into effect in July, 2012.
103  Ironically, only last summer media 
attention honed in on egg safety to an unprecedented degree.  The egg beat became 
popular because of a salmonella outbreak in the spring and summer of 2010 centered on 
eggs produced at two large Iowa producers.
104  By the fall, than 500 million eggs had 
been recalled, making it the largest egg recall in U.S. history.
105  Both farms involved in 
the recall, Wright Farms and Hillandale Farms, used a chick supplier that was a 
participant in the APHIS NPIP monitoring regime.
106  The outbreak focused attention on 
two aspects of the salmonella concern: first that scientists still are not in agreement or 
certainty as to exactly how salmonella spreads or how it typically infects poultry; and 
second that one clear means it does so, and one easily regulated through preventive 
restrictions, is through rodent droppings and activity.
107   
Besides the recall and other outbreak tracking activities undertaken with the CDC, 
FDA also committed in the wake of the Iowa incident to inspect the 600 largest U.S. egg 
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WK5. 28 
producers over the course of a year.
108  It conducted inspections over the course of 2010 
and 2011 in two phases, first focusing on thirty five production firms “associated with 
previous outbreaks and/or poor compliance history.”
109  In reporting the results of these 
intensive inspections, FDA determined that most violations found were related to “failure 
to completely implement and/or consistently follow these [FDA Egg Safety Rule] plans 
and/or maintain all required documentation/records.”
110  Inspections are ongoing, and 
prioritized by likely risk, for the other large farms already subject to the FDA Egg 
Rule.
111  Also ongoing is a federal suit filed by parents of children made ill by the 
outbreak, claiming strict product liability, negligence, and negligence per se.
112 
The salmonella outbreak in the summer of 2010 raises intriguing questions both as to 
where our egg safety policy should head and also as to how federal legal authority will 
track that policy.
113  Most importantly a series of scientific studies present data showing 
that salmonella is less prevalent in eggs harvested from poultry raised cage-free than 
from caged poultry.
114  Critics of these studies argue that the relatively new condition of 
most cage-free facilities make them difficult to compare against older, caged facilities 
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and thus clouds any argument of a lower risk for salmonella.
115  Still, there are signs that 
to cage or not may not be the only modern agricultural practice implicated in the recent 
higher prevalence of salmonella.  Going back as far as the early 1990s, the respected 
government research agency, the Institute of Medicine, issued a study on the issue noting, 
“[T]he introduction of feedlots and large-scale poultry rearing and processing facilities 
has been implicated in the increasing incidence of human pathogens, such as Salmonella, 
in domestic animals over the past 30 years.”
116  Non-profit animal welfare, consumer 
advocacy, and environmental groups are advocating strongly for new laws dealing with 
so-called “factory farm” eggs and increasingly meeting with success in state capitals.
117   
This success holds out the possibility of a fundamental re-ordering in the nature of 
U.S. egg regulation.  For much of the past century, federal agencies have regulated 
production and transport for safety while the states have concerned themselves with 
safety at the retail level and with quality control.  State regulation of farm operations 
would mean state regulatory movement directly into the production sphere.  However, the 
EPIA contains an explicit provision guaranteeing continued ability for state regulation, 
outside of egg processing plants.
118  Greater activity at the state level will likely increase 
political and institutional pressure at the USDA and FDA to more directly regulate 
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agricultural practices involved in egg production, using authority under the Animal 
Health Protection Act, EPIA, FDCA, and PHSA.  As this paper has attempted to show, 
those legal authorities provide amble legal means to regulate practices such as cage-free 
birds.  Any resistance to such regulation at the federal level should come from policy 
preferences or political will and not from worries about legal authority to do so. 
 
 